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ABSTRACT. When hydrological models are used in support of water management decisions, stakeholders
often contest these models because they perceive certain aspects to be inadequately addressed. A strongly
contested model may be abandoned completely, even when stakeholders could potentially agree on the
validity of part of the information it can produce. The development of a new model is costly, and the results
may be contested again. We consider how existing hydrological models can be used in a policy process so
as to benefit from both hydrological knowledge and the perspectives and local knowledge of stakeholders.
We define a code of conduct as a set of “rules of the game” that we base on a case study of developing a
water management plan for a Natura 2000 site in the Netherlands. We propose general rules for agenda
management and information sharing, and more specific rules for model use and option development.
These rules structure the interactions among actors, help them to explicitly acknowledge uncertainties, and
prevent expertise from being neglected or overlooked. We designed the rules to favor openness, protection
of core stakeholder values, the use of relevant substantive knowledge, and the momentum of the process.
We expect that these rules, although developed on the basis of a water-management issue, can also be
applied to support the use of existing computer models in other policy domains. As rules will shape actions
only when they are constantly affirmed by actors, we expect that the rules will become less useful in an
“unruly” social environment where stakeholders constantly challenge the proceedings.
Key Words: case study; conflict; hydrological model; institutions; Netherlands; participation; policy
process; water management
INTRODUCTION
Background
Article 14 of the European Water Framework
Directive (WFD) requires stakeholder participation
and the use of expert knowledge in water
management decision processes (Eurpoean Union
2000). Although the benefits of stakeholder
participation for a policy process are advocated on
theoretical grounds in the literature (Fiorino 1990,
Laird 1993, Webler 1995), with regard to empirical
findings, Delli Carpini et al. (2004) note that:
“Although the research...demonstrates numerous
positive effects of deliberation it also suggests
deliberation under less optimal circumstances can
be ineffective at best or counterproductive at worst.”
The policy literature makes it clear that the use of
expert knowledge may likewise be problematic.
When scientific expertise is solicited by policy
makers to legitimize decisions, it loses its authority
in situations where: (1) science fails in predicting
policy outcomes because of uncertain knowledge,
(2) different scientists can be found to support
different policies because competing theories
means there is no single “truth” (Weingart 1999),
and (3) stakeholders perceive aspects to be
inadequately addressed (Hoppe 1999, van Buuren
and Edelenbos 2004). Despite these difficulties, the
policy literature also makes it clear that
participatory processes are essential for linking
science and policy (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof
1999, Munnichs 2004).
Therefore, implementing the WFD poses a
substantial challenge for water managers. Water
systems are physically complex, and expert
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knowledge, in large part embodied in computer
models, is often partial and rife with uncertainties
(Walters 1997). Moreover, water systems are
intricately linked to virtually all types of human
activity. This means that water-related decision
processes must deal with competing values,
preferences, and perspectives of many different
stakeholders (Blomquist and Schlager 2005,
Blackmore et al. 2007). As water is a vital resource,
the stakes are high. Meanwhile, knowledge about
the socioeconomic system is distributed over
different scientific disciplines, as well as locally
over the actors concerned by a specific water-related
issue. Consequently, the available knowledge, both
physical and socioeconomic, is often contested by
stakeholders (van Latesteijn 1998, Fischer 2003).
Focus
Here, we focus in particular on the role of
knowledge about physical water systems that is
embodied in hydrological computer models. Van
Daalen et al. (2002) show that in environmental
policy development, computer models can play
different roles: they can serve as: (1) eye-openers,
by drawing attention to a specific issue, (2)
arguments in dissent, by advocating a particular
world view, (3) vehicles in creating consensus, by
accommodating alternative perspectives, and (4)
management tools, by assessing the effects of policy
measures. The hydrological models that we
observed in our case study served in the fourth of
these roles.
Although hydrological models represent only a
limited range of aspects of the physical world,
nevertheless, they tend to be “black boxes” in the
sense that decision makers and stakeholders cannot
easily verify whether the predictions these models
make are realistic. They have to largely rely on the
competence of the modelers to produce reliable
images of future states of the world. This makes
“trust” in models a key factor in policy processes
(Shackley 1997, Saunders-Newton and Scott 2001).
Lack of such trust can hamper the process. When
the validity of a model is contested, it may be
discarded in its entirety, even when stakeholders
could potentially agree on the validity of part of the
information that it produces. This information is
then lost to the process. Developing new models as
proof against the objections made is costly in time
and resources, and even when these are available
(which is often not the case), the results obtained
with the improved model may eventually be
contested again.
One strategy to avoid such stalemates is to involve
decision makers and stakeholders in the process of
model development with an aim to increasing trust
by making the “black box” transparent (Pahl-Wostl
2002, van Eeten et al. 2002, Barreteau 2003, Etienne
et al. 2003, Jackson 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2006, Howick
et al. 2007, Bots and van Daalen 2008). When
guidelines are provided (Smith Korfmacher 2001,
Caminiti 2004, Karas 2004, Voinov and Brown
Gaddis 2008), these typically set objectives (e.g.,
the modeling process should be transparent, the
public should participate continuously and have
influence on modeling decisions) and suggest
tactics (e.g., make modelers document and present
their assumptions and the model’s uncertainties and
limitations, manage the expectations of stakeholders
from the start). However, they do not make clear
how these objectives can be attained or how these
tactics can be implemented procedurally.
A second strategy is to determine, in interaction with
decision makers and stakeholders, for what
purposes the model could still be used. This strategy
differs from the first in that the objective is not to
develop a model that meets the information need for
a given decision scope for all parties, but to develop
the parties’ understanding of the capabilities and
limitations of a given model and adapt the decision
scope to these. This strategy will require fewer
resources, but it may resolve only part of the issue,
and/or still require new model development. The
decision context will guide which strategy is
preferred.
The second strategy was adopted in the case we
studied. To our knowledge, this strategy has not
received attention in the literature. Therefore, the
question we focus on here is how existing
hydrological models can be used effectively in a
multistakeholder setting, even when their validity
is questioned. Ehrmann and Stinson (1999)
emphasize that processes to deal with policy
situations in which the level of trust among parties
is low must be firmly embedded in the larger policy
decision-making process by defining a set of
“ground rules.” Taking this to heart, our aim is to
define “rules of the game” that set a standard for
actors in particular roles in the process as to “how
to behave,” insofar as existing hydrological models
are concerned.
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Case Study
The set of rules that we propose is inspired by a
participatory process that took place in The
Netherlands. It concerns the water management
issue of defining a so-called “desired groundwater
and surface water regime” (Gewenst Grond- en
Oppervlaktewater Regime [GGOR]) for the Barge-
rveen, a nature-conservation area in the province of
Drenthe in the northeast of the Netherlands. The
Bargerveen has been given Natura 2000 status, and
the Dutch national government mandated that a
GGOR be formulated for all Natura 2000 areas by
the end of 2007, as part of a full-fledged Natura 2000
management plan that was to be developed by the
province before 2010. The intention of the
Bargerveen GGOR was to strike a balance among
competing water interests in the Bargerveen and its
surrounding area, which is primarily agricultural
land.
The local Dutch water authorities, or “water
boards,” and the national authorities responsible for
rural development have agreed on a general
procedure for determining a GGOR for a particular
geographical area (Gehrels 2003, Nationaal
Bestuursakkoord Water 2003, Vlotman and Jansen
2003). This procedure first establishes reference
water regimes: (1) the “actual” regime that is
currently in practice (AGOR), and (2) a theoretical
“optimal” water regime (OGOR) for each land-use
function in the area, that is, agriculture, housing,
industry, or nature, for example. To determine what
is “optimal,” the relation between the groundwater
regime, soil type, and “land-use performance” has
been established for a broad range of functions
(Gehrels et al. 2003). The performance indicator is
a percentage, where 0% indicates the worst case, for
example, maximum crop loss because of drought or
local disappearance of a species, and 100% indicates
the best case, for example, optimal crop yield or
optimal ecological conditions. This indicator has
been calculated for the most important crop types
and nature types for the full range of soil type–
groundwater regime combinations using best
available knowledge.
Once AGOR and OGORs are known, alternative
water regimes are defined and assessed in an
iterative process until a regime is found that realizes
a certain percentage (typically >70%) of the optimal
performance. If this criterion cannot be satisfied for
the present land-use functions using the available
means for operational water management, changing
land use, and/or taking more radical hydrological
measures, may be considered. The GGOR
procedure presupposes the use of hydrological
models for ex-ante assessment of such measures.
In line with the WFD, the Dutch national
administrative water agreement requires a GGOR
to be developed in close cooperation with
stakeholders (Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water
2003, Article 5). The water board (“Velt en Vecht”),
being the responsible authority for the formulation
of Bargerveen GGOR, wanted to achieve a broadly
supported GGOR, to avoid rejection in the
upcoming provincial planning process. The water
board opted for an approach that reflects what Laird
(1993) calls “pluralism,” as opposed to “direct
participation,” as it involves a “sounding-board
group” whose members have been selected such that
all stakeholder positions are represented. The water
board employed the fourth author of this article, a
private consultant with experience in participatory
decision-making processes on regional water
management issues, to lead the process, supported
by a team of employees of the water board and an
external hydrological-modeling consultant. The
water board invited the other authors of this article
to take part in the stakeholder participation process
design, implementation, and evaluation.
Outline
The “rules of the game” that we focus on were not
defined ex ante and then “imposed” on the GGOR
process but, rather, they were elicited ex post. Our
research aim was to make explicit the “rules of the
game” that, from our perspective, have implicitly
been steering the cooperative behavior of
participants in the GGOR process that we were
involved in as researchers and practitioners. We
present the conceptual model that we used as the
basis for formulating “rules of the game,” followed
by the “rules” that we derived, and demonstrate
where we observed them as “rules in action” in the
GGOR process. Finally, we reflect on local
conditions that may influence the efficacy of the
proposed code of conduct.
METHODS
The work we present here is what Schön (1983) calls
“reflection on action.” Intrigued by the particular
way in which existing hydrological models were
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challenged but nevertheless used in the Bargerveen
GGOR process, we decided to analyze this process
by looking at the underlying institutions (North
1990, Ostrom 1990, 1999). The GGOR procedure
is embedded in legislation and, therefore, is what
North (1990) calls a “formal” institution. It provides
a rational framework for decision making. The
participatory implementation of the GGOR
procedure by the water board (Velt en Vecht) builds
on “informal” institutions, that is, conventions and
norms of behavior. Our aim was to elicit these as
procedural rules that describe what actions are
considered appropriate for, and expected from,
participants. Our “rules of the game” should
specifically address the use of computational
models and, preferably, afford generalization
beyond the GGOR context.
The term “rules of the game” encompasses several
aspects. Rules are social constructs that shape social
action, while at the same time they are reaffirmed
through being used by social actors (Giddens 1984,
Ostrom et al. 1984, North 1990). Rules will
continuously be interpreted and contested by actors,
because they constrain them. Social interaction
“about“ rules will typically be structured by
additional rules. The general GGOR procedure, for
example, was enacted following a well-established
formal legislative procedure. In contrast, the GGOR
itself provided no clear rules for its implementation
in a participatory way. We investigated how this
“institutional void” (Hajer 2003) was filled,
focusing on the rules; we did not examine the
mechanisms by which these rules were adopted,
such as policy learning (Grin and Loeber 2006), or
negotiation (Fiorino 1990).
We articulated the rules following the process; they
were not used overtly, in the sense of being made
explicit to participants, to design the process.
However, many of the ideas that we now articulate
as rules were brought to the fore by the authors
during project team meetings in which the next steps
for the process were discussed, such as holding
sounding-board group meetings and other
interactions with stakeholder groups, experts, or
modelers.
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) provide a general
syntax for rules. This syntax is represented by the
acronym ADICO, where A=attributes that identify
specific participants to which the rule applies, D=
the deontic operator that specifies whether the rule
permits, forbids, or obliges participants to take some
action, I=aim, that is, the particular action or
outcome to which the rule refers, C=conditions that
specify when, where, and how the rule applies, and
O=“or else,” the part of the rule that specifies the
consequences for a participant who does not comply
with the rule. As an example, we parse a “rule of
the game” for a joint fact-finding process proposed
by Ehrman and Stinson (1999) according to the
ADICO syntax: “Participants in a joint fact-finding
process (A) must not (D) distribute any information
they receive (I) until the group as a whole agrees on
the timing and method of its distribution (C).” This
example shows that not all parts need to be present.
An “or-else” part could look like this example: when
a participant has information that pertains to the
policy decision (C), this participant (A) must (D)
share this information with other participants (I), or
else this information may be ignored by the decision
makers (O).
We use the ADICO model to denote our “rules of
the game.” The A-part of these rules is either “all
participants”, i.e., the set of actors who take an active
part in the policy process, or one of the five subsets
of participants that we define below by describing
their characteristic role attributes:
 
l
 Stakeholders: actors whose interests may be
affected by the policy decisions that will
result from the policy process that is being
investigated;
l
 Decision makers: actors with the authority to
make these policy decisions;
l
 Modelers: actors who have the technical
competence to develop and operate
computational models;
l
 Experts: actors whose knowledge on a
particular topic is acknowledged by all
participants;
l
 Process manager: the actor responsible for
managing the policy process by planning and
facilitating the interaction among participants;
and
l
 Process sponsor: the actor who has
commissioned the management of the policy
process to the process manager and who can
decide on the resources that are allocated for
this process; this role is also referred to as
“lead agency” (Beierle and Konisky 2000,
Ryan 2001).
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 These actor roles need not be mutually exclusive.
Modelers, for example, usually also are, or become,
experts; stakeholders may also be experts on
particular aspects of the social–ecological system
(“local knowledge”); experts may also be
stakeholders, for example, ecologists who
champion a particular species; and process sponsors
are often also are decision makers. Moreover, the
term “actor” may refer to multiple people so, despite
their singular form, the roles of process sponsor and
process manager may be assumed by several
individuals.
In the “rules of the game,” we distinguish the
following entities:
 
l
 Social–ecological system: the part of the real
world that is the object of the policy process
for which the “rules of the game” are defined;
l
 Measure: a course of action that is expected
to produce desirable changes in the state of
the social–ecological system;
l
 Option: a particular course of action that may
be implemented;
l
 Decision: a choice from among several
alternative options; a decision may be
substantive, i.e., part of the policy, for
example, on what measures to take, or on
budget limits; as well as procedural, i.e., on
the way to proceed in the policy process, for
example, on what model to use, or on whom
to invite, and what to discuss during the next
meeting;
l
 Agenda: an overview that shows all decisions
that are relevant for the policy process and
specifies for each decision whether it is still
“open,” that is, where no choice has been
made among alternative options and new
options can still be proposed, “near closure,”
that is, no choice has been made but sufficient
information on options and consequences is
available to make a choice, or “closed,” that
is, the choice for a particular option has been
made;
l
 Model: a representation of the social–
ecological system that can predict, with some
degree of accuracy, the consequences of
implementing a particular measure; the set of
variables and their computational relationships
constitute the “structure” of the model. We
distinguish between “input variables,” i.e.,
variables with assigned values (“inputs”) to
represent measures (e.g., digging ditches) and
exogenous factors (e.g., precipitation levels),
“parameters,” i.e., variables whose constant
values represent invariable system characteristics
(e.g., the geometry and hydraulic conductivity
of soil layers), and “output variables,” i.e.,
variables whose values (“outputs”) are
computed when the model is executed, and
of interest to participants (e.g., minimum,
maximum, and average groundwater levels);
and
l
 Scenario: a set of inputs that when the model
is executed is expected to produce outputs
that predict the effects of a measure as
accurately as possible, given the model’s
structure and parameters.
 Figure 1 highlights some of the assumptions we
make with regard to the relative position of some of
these actor roles and entities:
 
l
 The agenda is determined by stakeholders,
decision makers, the process manager, and
process sponsor. The open decisions on the
agenda correspond to an information need.
l
 These same actors can provide local
knowledge, whereas experts provide expertise.
The distinction between these two types of
knowledge hinges on the recognition of the
source as an expert.
l
 Modelers develop the model by modifying its
structure and/or parameters, and “translate”
proposed measures into scenarios.
l
 Local knowledge, expertise, and model
output are expected to satisfy the information
need to some extent, that is, the “match”
between supply and demand of information.
The term “surplus” refers to information that
is considered irrelevant to the decisions on
the agenda, whereas information that is
lacking is denoted as “uncertainties.”
Uncertainties inform agenda setting and
model development.
The diagram in Fig. 1 does not identify actions and,
thus, does not reflect the dynamics of the policy
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Fig. 1. Elements of a model-informed participatory policy process.
process. The implicit assumption is that the actors
will affect the agenda either directly by their actions,
or indirectly by provoking actions of other actors.
If we make the assumption that all actions are
governed by (implicit) rules, then the set of rules we
define should be a “closed system” that covers all
process activities in such a way that actions
triggered by one rule produce changes that trigger
new rules, or the process terminates.
To assess whether the set of rules as a whole can
produce the type of participatory process that we
observed, we chose the framework proposed by de
Bruijn et al. (2002). The four core elements of this
framework are compatible with the general criteria
of fairness and competence put forward by Webler
(1995), but also make explicit the time aspect of a
participatory process:
 
1. Openness: the process is open in terms of
participation, that is, all stakeholders have
access to the process; problem definition, for
example, broad in scope, and flexible; and
solution space, that is, there are no pre-set
restrictions as to what constitutes a good
solution.
2. Protection of core values: the process does
not lead participants to act against their own
interests.
3. Substance: the process makes use of relevant
substantive knowledge, drawing on the
capacity within the stakeholder network to
generate variety as well as to make selections.
4. Speed: the process gains and maintains
sufficient momentum to achieve significant
results in the end.
 Obviously, tensions exist among these elements.
For example, if (new) stakeholders bring up new
considerations, the process may not come to a
conclusion; that is, there is a trade-off between
openness and speed. If decisions are based on a
particular model, some stakeholders may opt out for
fear of it producing unfavorable results for them;
there is a tension between substance and protection
of core values. Therefore, when we defined our
“rules of the game,” we checked whether they would
allow the process manager to strike a balance among
all four elements.
Our post-hoc rule definition process was essentially
heuristic. Using the elements in Fig. 1, the first
author drew up a “skeleton set” of rules that, when
“executed,” would produce a very general “fair and
competent process” (Webler 1995). He then
gradually extended this set, aiming to cover as much
as possible of the activities and decisions observed
in the Bargerveen GGOR process as rules that
specify what is “proper behavior” for participants
in this process. In this way, the deontic operator, D 
in the ADICO syntax, always obliged participant A 
to do I, given condition C. The “or-else” part O of
the rules was left implicit, as no concrete sanctions
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on rule breaking were observed. The rule set was
then critiqued by the second author, modified, and
reviewed again. The set was then validated by the
other authors, notably the manager of the GGOR
process herself. Finally, to check relevance and
completeness, the second author used the rule set as
a coding scheme to label the occurrence of “rules in
action” found in the condensed process description.
RESULTS
We present the results of our analysis as four sets
of rules:
 
1. Agenda-management rules (AM) that
regulate the decision making process;
2. Information-transparency rules (IT) that
regulate the development of a shared
information set;
3. Model-transparency rules (MT) that regulate
the communication about models and model
output; and
4. Measure-proposal rules (MP) that regulate
how participants can put forward measures to
resolve the policy issue
 The first two sets apply to the overall process. They
provide the context for the other two sets, which
specifically address the use of models to assess
policy measures. We did not examine the rules that
guided the selection of participants, but the general
principle was that all relevant stakeholders should
be represented. Being very familiar with the
Bargerveen area and the interests at stake, the
process sponsor and process manager drew up an
initial list of delegates. During its first meeting, this
“sounding-board group” (see Appendix 1) worked
on identifying interests and stakeholders that were
not yet represented, and people who should be
included.
 
We denote the rules using a syntax that is based on
ADICO but allows some “shorthand.” The attribute-
part A of a rule will always be one of the participant
roles. We can leave the deontic operator D implicit,
because all of our rules define appropriate behavior.
This means that all verb phrases denote aims (I).
When the condition-part C is omitted, this should
be read as “at all times.” Such rules expect constant
vigilance from the participants it concerns. When
rules logically fall in sequence because one rule
creates the condition for another, we present these
rules together to further improve legibility.
Agenda-Management Rules
l
 AM-1: The process manager prioritizes the
decisions on the agenda, explains why the
decisions need to be made and why in that
particular order, to progress towards the final
policy decision, and determines which actors
are “decision makers” for which decision.
 
l
 AM-2: For each decision on the agenda, the
stakeholders indicate “near closure,” that is,
when they find the available information
sufficiently complete and reliable for making
the decision, or they indicate what
uncertainties exist that prevent closure.
 
l
 AM-3: When a decision on the agenda is
“near closure,” the associated decision
makers choose an option and explicate their
deliberation while referencing the available
information. The process manager then
marks these decisions as “closed.”
 
l
 AM-4: When uncertainties prohibit progress,
that is, no high priority decisions are “near
closure,” the process manager consults with
the process sponsor on the availability of
resources, and with the modelers and experts
on possible additional analysis. The process
manager then develops alternative options for
dealing with the uncertainties, and places this
procedural decision on the agenda.
 Rule AM-1 constitutes the process manager as the
“procedure maker.” It is a crucial rule: if the process
manager fails to establish and maintain a legitimate
agenda, all other rules fail automatically. The rule
states that the process manager “determines,” rather
than “decides,” who is decision maker for which
decision. Thus, if the choice of decision maker
becomes an issue, it can be put on the agenda as a
procedural decision for which the process manager
can propose decision makers.
The agenda management rules mainly favor speed,
but rule AM-2 allows stakeholders to protect their
interests. Rule AM-4 ensures that the process cannot
“block,” allowing the process manager to diagnose
the lack of decisiveness and frame the problem as a
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procedural decision. The alternative options for this
decision will be either to “accept uncertainty,” that
is, the decision makers take their responsibility and
accept the risk that may be involved, “reduce
uncertainty, ” that is, the decision makers seek
additional information, or “reduce decision scope,”
that is, the decision makers look for alternative
decision options that pose less uncertainty. Rules
AM-1 and AM-2 ensure that the information that is
needed to make this procedural decision will be
sought before a choice is made. The obvious catch
is that it may be difficult to identify a legitimate
decision maker for this procedural decision. It is
typically at this point that the process manager will
have to choose a trade-off between the four core
elements, and powerful actors such as the process
sponsor or decision makers are likely to exert their
influence.
Information-Transparency Rules
l
 IT-1: The participants communicate what
information they consider to be relevant,
specifying the decision(s) that should be
based on this information.
 
l
 IT-2: The participants report when they
obtain new information that may be relevant
for decision making.
 
l
 IT-3: The process manager maintains and
shares with all participants an overview of the
information that has been identified as
relevant and/or available.
 
l
 IT-4: The participants note the information
that is available and notify the process
manager of information that appears to be
contradictory or missing. The process
manager notes these instances as uncertainties
in the overview.
 
l
 IT-5: The participants identify people they
consider to be knowledgeable on a subject
where uncertainty has been identified. The
process manager verifies with these people to
see whether they can indeed contribute
relevant information. If so, these people are
invited to participate in the process as experts.
 
l
 IT-6: If different experts are proposed for the
same subject, these experts determine
whether their views conflict. If so, the experts
clarify their differences of opinion. These
differences are noted as uncertainties.
 The decisions referred to by these rules may be
substantive as well as procedural. Likewise, the
information may be substantive as well as “meta-
information,” for example, information on where
other information can be found, or information on
the quality of other information. The information-
transparency rules mainly favor openness and
substance, but rules IT-1, IT-5 and IT-6 also allow
stakeholders to protect their interests. Rule IT-5 is
an “entry rule” in the sense that it allows new actors
to become participants. With rule IT-2, individuals
who accept the invitation to participate as an expert
on a subject share their knowledge on this subject
with all participants.
Model-Transparency Rules
l
 MT-1: The stakeholders explain which
phenomena in the social–ecological system
are of particular interest to them in such a way
that the modelers can assess whether, or to
what degree of accuracy, these phenomena
can be predicted by the model.
 
l
 MT-2: The modelers explain the structure and
parameters of the model, as well as the
scenarios that are evaluated, in such a way
that the stakeholders can assess which
phenomena in the system are represented in
what detail, and what this means for the
uncertainties in the model output.
 
l
 MT-3: The process manager maintains and
shares an overview of the aspects that are
known to be (not) represented by the model
and clearly relates this to the information that
has been identified (by rule IT-1) as relevant
for some decision(s) on the agenda.
 
l
 MT-4: When there are alternative models or
alternative ways of representing an aspect in
the model, the modelers communicate to the
process manager, the options and their
consequences in terms of what the model can
and cannot do. The process manager then
adds the choice from among these alternatives
to the agenda as a procedural decision.
 
l
 The model-transparency rules follow the
same principles as the information-
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transparency rules, but expand these by
making explicit the joint responsibility of
modelers and stakeholders to make “black-
box” models more transparent.
Measure-Proposal Rules
l
 MP-1: The participants propose a measure
first as a generic option, i.e., as a class of
possible options, leaving design parameters
and implementation details unspecified.
 
l
 MP-2: When the effects of a generic option
have been noted as uncertain, the modelers
calculate these effects using different
scenarios to reveal the range of impacts of
this class of options.
 
l
 MP-3: The process manager communicates
the results of this impact assessment with all
participants. The stakeholders then express
their opinion with regard to the option’s
desirability and feasibility. With rule IT-2 and
IT-3, the impact assessment results, together
with the stakeholder opinion, are added to the
information set.
 
l
 MP-4: During formal meetings, participants
refrain from discussing options for which the
impacts are still being assessed.
 The measure-proposal rules mainly favor openness,
substance, and speed. From rule AM-2 (in
combination with rule IT-2), it follows that
participants can propose a new policy measure at
any time in the process. Rule MP-2 mitigates the
risk of losing time and resources on model exercises
that are unlikely to produce relevant new
information, whereas rule MP-4 aims to avoid
losing time on premature discussions. The
interaction between measure-proposal rules and
information-transparency rules ensure the protection
of core values (IT-4 provides guidance in the event
that actors disagree on the option’s effects). The
agenda-management rules provide guidance in the
event that the impact assessment requires additional
model development. Likewise, they guide the
process of developing generic measures into more
specific measures because actors will not indicate
“near closure” until information on the impacts of
sufficiently detailed option variants is available.
The Bargerveen Case Study
The four sets of rules are the result of our reflection
on the Bargerveen GGOR process, in which we were
involved as researchers and practitioners. Here, we
discuss the water management issue in question, as
well as the stakeholders.
The Bargerveen area is situated in the east of the
Netherlands at the border with Germany, in the
Dutch province of Drenthe. It has recently received
Natura 2000 status, which makes it a priority nature-
conservation area. The Dutch ministry for
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (Landbouw,
Natuurbeheer en Voedselkwaliteit [LNV]) has
formulated nature-development objectives for the
area (LNV 2006, 2007), which is home a type of
living high peat that is unique in Europe. The main
objective is to increase the total area of high peat,
which is currently declining. This requires the
groundwater level to be raised, which will affect the
water regime in the surrounding area.
The stakeholders in the area share a long history of
negotiation over the water regime; they are
collectively well organized. The last attempt to
settle the water-regime conflict in 2001 resulted in
an agreement for the north and west side of the
Bargerveen, but failed for the south side. The
German side (east) was not included. The Natura
2000 status of the Bargerveen re-opened the
negotiations. The water board decided to restrict
these negotiations to the south and east side, leaving
the existing agreements undisputed.
Key actors for these new negotiations—the GGOR
process— are: the water board, the national nature-
conservation agency responsible for operational
management of the Bargerveen (Staatsbosbeheer
[SBB]) and the farmers whose lands will be affected
by a change in water regime. These farmers are
organized in a local chapter of the national
agriculture and horticulture organization. The farms
are mostly family businesses and the land is
alternately used for intensive crop growing and
dairy farming. The current water regime is already
quite “wet” for this land use. The water-regime
conflict brings about uncertainty for farm
management, and the farmers are calling for clarity
and action. They are apprehensive about getting
involved in yet another indecisive negotiation
process. Additional stakeholders are the local
residents, entrepreneurs, neighboring municipalities,
and the German local water authorities. The GGOR
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is to be approved by the board of directors of the
water board, then by the province of Drenthe, and
ultimately by the ministry of LNV. All interests are
represented in the sounding-board group (see
Appendix 1).
Rules in Action: The Bargerveen Process,
Focusing on Hydrological Models and
Expertise
The GGOR project team, including the process
manager, modelers, and support staff, started the
GGOR process in June 2006. We distinguish four
phases in our description of the process. The first
phase was the preparation phase, ending with the
installation of the sounding-board group in October
2006. The second phase, which lasted until April
2007, was focused on the development of a shared
knowledge base. In this phase, the participants
agreed on the reference water regimes AGOR
(actual water regime) and OGOR (optimal water
regime) for the primary interests of agriculture and
nature conservation. The rest of the process,
directed at defining GGOR, can roughly be divided
in two phases: the selection of a model and
identification of possible measures, which lasted up
to November 2007, and the assessment of these
measures and definition of a GGOR, which took
until April 2008.
During the preparation phase, the project team
performed a stakeholder analysis (Bryson 2004) and
developed a “plan of approach” for defining the
GGOR for the Bargerveen. The process manager
presented this plan at the first sounding-board group
meeting (IT-3). She urged participants to comment
on the plan and on the composition of the sounding-
board group, and to share other information that they
considered relevant (IT-2). The farmers observed
that the plan did not include defining an OGOR for
the surrounding agricultural land, and stressed the
relevance of knowing the current deviation from the
optimal water regime to realistically judge the
consequences of new measures for agriculture
(IT-1). The process manager proposed to let the
project sponsor decide on this (AM-1), and the water
board agreed to include the task in the plan (AM-3).
To develop a complete information base and
determine the reference water regimes for nature
conservation and agriculture, the process manager
organized bilateral meetings. The OGOR for an area
depends on the land use. The project team suggested
basing the land use in the agricultural area on
satellite data from 2003 (IT-3). The farmers did not
agree to this (IT-4), arguing that the land use varies
each year and that the satellite data provided a
random snapshot. They proposed basing the
agriculture OGOR on the form of land use requiring
the lowest water level (IT-1). This appeared to be a
strategic move. When the water-board professionals
judged the optimal water regime as being too dry
for agricultural purposes, the farmers remained
noncommittal. In a second meeting, they explained
that local water buffering is possible, but that there
are no means for coping with “wet” regimes. The
project team accepted this argument (AM-1) and
decided to follow the farmers’ proposal (AM-3).
The definition of the nature-conservation OGOR
was hindered by many uncertainties (IT-4). The
Natura 2000 objectives did not specify where in the
Bargerveen high peat growth should be realized,
and the optimal conditions for high peat
development were not determined (IT-4). The
process manager consulted a team of experts
identified by SBB (IT-5). Despite differences of
opinion, this team agreed on a best available expert
opinion for the OGOR for nature conservation
(IT-6). They stressed that high peat is very particular
and needs near optimal conditions to develop.
At the second sounding-board meeting in April
2007, the process manager first shared the results
of the bilateral meetings with the farmers and SBB
(IT-3). The optimal regimes for nature conservation
and agriculture differed widely: the OGOR for
nature conservation entailed an expected highest
groundwater level (in winter and spring) for the
agricultural area that was several meters above the
1.2 m below-ground surface that was considered
optimal by the farmers. Neither OGOR came close
to the water regime currently in practice (AGOR).
The process manager opened the discussion by
pointing out that the Bargerveen’s natural processes
would only benefit from a drastic change in water
regime—too drastic for the water board to decide
upon, because the options were either to do nothing
and accept a degradation of the peat vegetation, or
to create a hydrological buffer zone around the
Bargerveen at the expense of agricultural activities.
The process manager proposed to leave this decision
to the province and LNV (AM-1), as these
organizations are vested with the capacity to either
change the nature-conservation objectives, or
authorize a change in land use and finance a buffer
zone. The participants did not agree with this
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strategy, arguing that the available information did
not warrant such a step (AM-2). The farmers feared
that decisions would be made with insufficient
consideration of their interests. Staatsbosbeheer
wanted more information about the effects of the
proposed measures, and there was no consensus
about the effects of a buffer zone (IT-1).
At the conclusion of this sounding-board group
meeting, there was a call for additional analysis
(AM-4). The executive board of the water board did
not want to embark on a costly model exercise. They
felt that sufficient information was available from
past studies, and aimed for a fundamentally political
decision to be made by the province and LNV. Nor
were the farmers interested in another model study;
they just wanted clarity about continuing to farm.
However, Staatsbosbeheer, was keen on having
accurate model calculations, as they feared ending
up with a buffer zone that would not produce the
conditions needed for high peat growth.
The available models were MIPWA (Berendrecht
et al. 2007) and Microfem (Hemker et al. 2004). The
modelers recommended using MIPWA to explore
the effects of proposed measures. This model was
especially designed to support GGOR processes in
the northern part of the Netherlands, and was co-
financed by the water board. The Microfem model,
tailored for the Bargerveen area but for a different
type of calculation, was considered inadequate
(MT-4). The project team started to prepare
MIPWA for calculations—without explicit approval
of the project sponsor—to produce quick results and
demonstrate the benefit of the calculations to the
project sponsor and participants. However, the
modelers soon identified serious shortcomings with
the model. It emerged that model enhancement
would take at least a year.
At this time, the project sponsor stalled the process
for strategic and financial reasons, thereby seizing
the role of process manager in AM-1. Before
allocating money for model enhancement and
calculations, the water board wanted to know
whether the province would be willing to support
and finance a buffer zone at all. The water board
principal contacted the provincial executive in
October 2007. The provincial executive requested
information about the effectiveness of a buffer zone
that would warrant the significant costs of this type
of measure (IT-1). Sensitive to the argument that
time and resources for obtaining detailed
information were lacking, the provincial executive
accepted to base her decision on the best possible
prediction with the available models (MT-1). As
MIPWA’s shortcomings precluded calculations of
any accuracy, the hydrologists re-evaluated the
Microfem model and concluded that the model
could give a rough indication of the effectiveness
of a buffer zone (MT-4). The executive board of the
water board decided to finance the application of
this model (AM-3).
This decision induced a series of model-related
activities and decisions. The process manager and
modelers discussed with the stakeholders how best
to develop information for the provincial executive.
The process manager decided to evaluate the effects
of a buffer zone of various types and sizes (MP-1).
She argued that information about the possible
range of impacts of the buffer zone would give more
direction to the discussion about its feasibility and
desirability (MP-2).The stakeholders found it odd
to spend resources on the exploration of a measure
without first discussing the feasibility and
desirability of the implementation details, but
nonetheless went along with the plan (MP-4).
The process manager organized meetings with each
of the key stakeholders and the provincial
representative of the sounding-board group to
discuss the intermediate model results (MP-3).
During these meetings, the modelers explained the
structure and parameters of the model, as well as
the scenarios evaluated. They presented the model
outputs visually with maps that showed the
predicted groundwater level related to the two
OGORs (MT-2). During these meetings, the process
manager stressed the limitations of the model and
urged the participants to make clear what, in their
opinion, could be decided on the basis of the
Microfem model (MT-3). Staatsbosbeheer initially
opposed using the rough Microfem model. They
critically assessed the model and the scenarios
evaluated, and proposed some changes, but finally
agreed on its use to determine the order of magnitude
of the effects of a buffer zone. The farmers proposed
additional scenarios to evaluate the effects of the
OGOR for agriculture on the Bargerveen, to which
the process manager agreed. Furthermore, they
communicated that they were not only interested in
water levels, but also in the drainage possibilities
for wet parcels (MT-1). Both SBB and the farmers
insisted that the process manager should explain to
the province not only the calculated effects but, also,
the opinions that they, as stakeholders, had given
on these effects (MP-3).
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The farmers also proposed evaluating an alternative
option: putting an impervious screen in the subsoil
between the Bargerveen and the agricultural land
(MP-1). The hydrologists explained that the
effectiveness of this measure could hardly be
evaluated ex ante. Such a screen must be placed
upon a completely impervious boulder clay layer.
Complete knowledge of the boulder clay layer is
impossible to obtain, which implies a high risk that
this measure might be ineffective. However, the
farmers had found an expert with a different opinion
(IT-4, IT-5). The process manager asked the experts
to discuss their difference in opinion, and in the end
they agreed that the effectiveness of an impervious
screen was very uncertain (IT-6).
The Microfem model calculations predicted that a
buffer zone at the south side of the Bargerveen at
least 500 m wide would be reasonably effective.
Based on this information, in February 2008, the
province gave the green light for negotiations about
a buffer zone (AM-3). A final sounding-board group
meeting was called in April 2008 to agree on a
GGOR “in principle.” This GGOR, in principle
because funding was not yet firm, comprised a 500–
m wide buffer zone along two-thirds of the south
border of the Bargerveen plus measures to
compensate the other interests. Before the meeting,
the director of SBB had personally given his
approval for this GGOR, and both the province and
LNV had committed to finding the financial
resources.
During the meeting, the farmers restated their
willingness to consolidate and sell land in return for
complete financial compensation and near-optimal
circumstances for the remaining agricultural land
(MP-3). The participants were about to state “near
closure” (AM-2) for the GGOR on the condition
that funding would be found, but then an influential
expert from SBB voiced that the organization still
had objections to the GGOR that would be put
forward after the meeting (MP-3). The farmers
instantly flew into a rage and voiced their distrust
of SBB; in the previous negotiation round of 2001,
SBB had made a similar move, rejecting an
agreement at the last moment. The process manager
reacted firmly, recalling the approval of the director
of SBB, and emphasizing that the expert was to
share any new information or considerations during
the meeting, and not afterward (IT-2). It appeared
that, possibly because of poor internal communication
within SBB, the expert was still looking for
negotiation space. The SBB manager present at the
meeting hurried to confirm that SBB agreed to the
GGOR, and no new information was brought
forward.
The water board, LNV, the province of Drenthe, and
SBB signed a formal agreement on the GGOR–in–
principle (still pending funding) for the Bargerveen
and its surrounding area in October 2008.
Subsequently, the GGOR was formally approved
by the provincial council and, in May 2009, the co
mplete plan, with a total budget of €20 million, was
ratified by the general board of Veld en Vecht. As
a first step in its implementation, a detailed water
management plan is presently elaborated for the
agricultural area south of the Bargerveen.
DISCUSSION
Having presented the “rules of the game” for a
model-informed participatory policy process, and
having shown how we observed these rules “in
action” in the Bargerveen GGOR process, we will
address the following questions:
 
l
 What’s new, or, more specifically, how do
our “rules of the games” differ from
guidelines and rules that have been reported
previously on this topic?
l
 What factors ensure that these rules will
effectively steer participant behavior?
l
 Related to the previous question, will these
rules work in other contexts?
l
 What is the contribution of this research to
the management of water resources and
associated social–ecological systems?
Comparison with other Guidelines and Rules
Guidelines for model development and use in policy
processes (Smith Korfmacher 2001, Caminiti 2004,
Karas 2004, Voinov and Brown Gaddis 2008)
emphasize good and continuous communication
between modelers and other participants about what
the model should preferably be able to do, from the
participants’ perspectives, and what it actually can
do, from the modelers’ perspectives. Our “rules of
the game” that relate specifically to the use of
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models (the sets MT and MP) do not go far beyond
this norm. However, guidelines per se are difficult
to put into practice. What we see as a distinctive
feature of our model-transparency rules and
measure-proposal rules is that they become
meaningful and practical because they are imbedded
in other, more general, rules for agenda
management and information transparency. Thus,
our “rules of the game” are more than guidelines;
the set as a whole constitutes a coherent system that
covers the use of information and models in a
participatory policy process.
Our “rules of the game” are conceptually similar to
the rules in the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 1999).
Nevertheless, they do not easily fit into the seven
broad types of rules presented by this framework.
Although the participant roles we defined can be
seen as “position” rules that define the positions or
roles that actors can take, we do not specify
“boundary” rules that define how actors can change
their position. When our “rules of the game” specify
by whom decisions are made, these can be seen as
“authority” rules, but we define no “aggregation”
rules that, for example, say that a majority of
participants suffices to determine whether a
decision on the agenda is near closure. We do not
specify “scope” rules that define the set of outcomes
that can be affected by decisions, nor do we specify
“payoff” rules that define how costs and benefits
are allocated when a final decision has been made.
Finally, we do not specify “information” rules that
define the information available to actors in specific
positions. Instead, all of our “rules of the game” are
based on a single, implicit information rule: all
information is to be available to all participants,
regardless of their position.
We see the incongruence between the seven IAD
rule types and our “rules of the game” as the result
of a difference in focus. Within the IAD framework,
the rules pertain to the use and management of a
common-pool resource, whereas our “rules of the
game” concern the organization of a policy process.
Ostrom et al. (1994) point out that a set of rules will
always be nested in another set of rules that define
how and by whom rules can be changed, so our
“rules of the game” could be seen as this other set.
Still, the relation between these is elusive and merits
analysis.
Conditions for Effectiveness
Evidently, rules will be effective only when the
actors concerned know the rules and have what it
takes to apply them. In the Bargerveen case, the
decision-making responsibilities of the government
agencies at different levels were formally
established in planning procedures. Even so, the
process manager put continuous effort into
clarifying these formal institutions to the
participants. Although the participants were already
familiar with the informal institution of the
sounding-board group, the purpose of this group and
the roles of its members were also made explicit.
This essentially corresponded to what we have
identified as information-transparency rules (IT-1
through IT-6).
To fulfill her pivotal role in the process, the process
manager must have a clear mandate from the process
sponsor and also from the other participants (Webler
1995, Reuzel et al. 2007). The role requires special
capabilities: some knowledge of the topic under
discussion which, in our case, was hydrology and
modeling; the capacity to synthesize and summarize
information, and track down external information
referred to by participants; and above all, the ability
to go firmly and consequently by the rules,
explaining, and motivating decisions, and to call out
of order those who do not observe the rules,
regardless of their position.
The process sponsor should commit to the process
but, preferably, have and retain the formal authority
to decide unilaterally in case of process failure (de
Bruijn et al. 2002). Such an overruling decision then
becomes the default “or else” for the “rules of the
game,” and the process manager can make this
explicit if participants cannot be held to the rules by
reason. The process sponsor should also be upfront
about time and budget constraints, or the process
manager cannot properly apply rule AM-1.
Our model-transparency rules focus on establishing
what part of the information need the model can
satisfy. Similar to the guidelines proposed by Karas
(2004) and Caminiti (2004), our rules implicitly
assume that the modelers have adequate knowledge
and skills, adhere to professional standards
(Refgaard et al. 2005, Jakeman et al. 2006), and,
even more importantly, are aware of their
limitations in these respects.
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In sum, the effectiveness of our “rules of the game”
largely depends on whether participants have the
competencies their role(s) require.
Transplantability
We expect that, in model-informed participatory
policy processes, our explicit set of “rules of the
game” can help to structure the interactions among
actors, thereby enabling effective participation.
How much it will help will depend on scale and
context. The Bargerveen GGOR had a local
character, yet, even so, the sounding-board group
was comprised of over 30 members. Adequate
stakeholder representation for controversial water
management issues on a regional or national scale
might entail several times this number. The
information-processing capacity required will rise
with the number of participants. The capacity of the
process manager may be scaled up by forming a
project team, but participants may soon find rules
AM-2 and IT-4 too demanding to comply with. To
avoid this, special support is needed (Enserink and
Monnikhof 2003).
Formal and informal institutions are closely related
to national culture (De Jong et al. 2002). Hofstede
(1983) has shown how national cultures and the
related formal and informal institutions they
embody differ along four dimensions: “individualism,”
“power distance,” “uncertainty avoidance,” and
“masculinity.” The existence of different national
cultures implies that the “rules of the game” that we
have defined may be specific to the Dutch
institutional context. The Dutch tradition of
collaborative decision making reflects its culture of
high individualism, small power distance, weak
uncertainty avoidance, and low masculinity index
values, following Hofstede’s dimensions. The same
rules may not function in a culture with different
index values. The agenda-management rules and
information-transparency rules favor an egalitarian
process (low power distance), in which participants
must feel free to defend their opinions (high
individualism) without trying to stand out or
dominate (low masculinity). Such rules may be
difficult to implement in countries with high power
distance (e.g., Belgium or France) or high
masculinity (e.g., Germany or the USA). Moreover,
De Jong (2004) makes clear that “transplantation”
of institutions from one context to another is
difficult even when the contexts have very similar
institutional characteristics.
The effectiveness of “rules of the game” will also
depend on the stability of the institutional context.
As Klijn (2001) puts it, rules “only continue to exist
if they are continually (re)affirmed by actors either
overtly or tacitly.” Our rules worked well in a policy
process that was legitimized by a formal institution,
namely, the GGOR procedure, with participants
who were very familiar with policy negotiations.
The “rules of the game” we have defined were
effective in the Bargerveen GGOR process because
most were already part of the “informal institutions”
and, hence, implicitly known to and accepted by the
participants. In less stable institutional contexts, for
example, without a formal procedure embedded in
legislation, or when informal institutions for policy
negotiations are lacking or favor confrontational
behavior, rules need to be negotiated by the actors
themselves (Ostrom 1990, Webler 1995, Ehrmann
and Stinson 1999, Hajer 2003).
Contribution to the Field
The Bargerveen case has demonstrated the value of
the deliberate implementation of an “institutional
design,” such as the GGOR procedure, for finding
ways to protect a vulnerable ecosystem while
respecting the socioeconomic interests of the
stakeholders. We believe that the results of our
reflection on this case may help to improve the
management of water resources and their associated
social–ecological systems on two levels.
On a practical level, the “rules of the game” that we
propose provide a detailed and yet general
description of a code of conduct that may serve as
a model for future participatory processes. This is
not a prescription to be followed indiscriminately,
but a “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer 1989):
the rules and their “vocabulary” may serve as an
“ideal type” of a model-informed participatory
policy process. Presenting them as a template in the
process-design phase will stimulate discussion
about what is “proper behavior” for each actor role,
and also about the competences required for each
role. This discussion will heighten the participants’
awareness of the important role of these “soft”
institutions in establishing a fair and transparent
process, and in determining the quality of
information and the capabilities and limitations of
models. This same discussion will help the process
manager take into account the caveats concerning
conditions for effectiveness and transplantability.
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On a methodological level, we have shown how the
ADICO syntax for rules proposed by Crawford and
Ostrom (1995) can be used, in combination with a
conceptual model of a participatory process, to
represent at a detailed level the “informal
institutions” that underlie such a process. Model and
rules may help structure future research. We
speculate that the rules we have defined for agenda
management and information transparency will
apply to a broad range of cases, and may be used as
a coding scheme for qualitative analysis and cross-
case comparison of process designs and their
implementation. One aspect to investigate in more
detail would be the relative importance of process
design and the level of competence of participants
in the role(s) they perform.
CONCLUSION
The particular way in which existing hydrological
models were challenged and nevertheless used in
the successful participatory development of a water
management plan in the Netherlands incited us to
analyze the code of conduct of participants’
interaction. This has resulted in a coherent system
of “rules of the game” that can guide the interaction
in model-informed participatory policy processes.
Compared to the situation-specific rules (i.e., plans,
policies, or institutions) for collaborative resource
management that are more commonly discussed in
the literature, the “rules of the game” we propose
are “meta-rules,” as they address the “organization
of a process” for developing such plans, policies, or
institutions.
We have structured our “rules of the game” in four
sets. The first two sets comprise general rules for
agenda management and information sharing, based
on the notion of “fair and competent process,” as
reported in the literature. The other two sets
comprise more specific rules for using models and
proposing policy measures. The rules complement
existing modeling guidelines, because they define
how to integrate models and information
procedurally in the process. They make explicit a
framework of informal institutions favorable for the
joint development of knowledge, and for a
constructive discussion on model limitations. The
focus on “fair process” and transparency of model-
based analysis enhances the trust-building
mechanism that is needed to compensate for the
intrinsic black-box character of an existing model.
We recognize that the applicability and
effectiveness of the proposed rules will depend on
the context of formal and informal institutions
already in place. Nevertheless, we contend that the
rules provide a useful reference model to support
discussion while designing and managing model-
informed participatory policy processes. As our set
of “rules of the game” also proved useful as a coding
scheme for ex-post analysis of a water management
policy process, we speculate that the rule-centered
language and approach taken in this research will
facilitate detailed cross-case comparison of process
designs.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art16/
responses/
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APPENDIX 1. Composition of the “sounding-board group” for the Bargerveen GGOR process.
The sounding-board group consisted of 30 delegates in total. The represented organizations are listed
below. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of delegates from an organization.
Governmental organizations
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
- Directorate of Regional Affairs North (2)
- Agency for Rural Development (1)
Province of Drenthe, The Netherlands (2)
Municipality of Emmen, The Netherlands (1)
Municipality of Twist, Germany (1)
Water board Velt en Vecht (3; 1 board member + 2 staff members not on the project team)
Nongovernmental organizations
SBB – Staatsbosbeheer, region North (4)
LTO – National agriculture and horticulture organization
- region North (3)
- local chapters (of region North) for Schoonebeek and Emmen-Oost (3)
Land division advisory committees for Schoonebeek and Emmen-Zuid (3)
Village council of Zwartemeer (1)
Village council of Weiteveen (1)
Farm owners on the south border of the Bargerveen (3)
Commercial enterprises
Firma Griendtsveen – trader in soil (1)
NAM – subsidiary of Shell (1)
